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Abstract
We study the problem of a government that wishes to share opti-
mally the burden of deficit finance among heterogeneous agents with
differential access to inside investment opportunities, when the gov-
ernment is not able to commit explicitly to honor its liabilities. In
the presence of private information, it is Pareto efficient for the gov-
ernment to borrow in a way that amounts to non-linear taxation, and
it must treat agents with access to the best investment opportunities
preferentially to keep them in the bond market. The fact that some
agents have access to other investments is a powerful force allowing
the government to voluntarily make payments on its inherited debt, if
the deficit is sufficiently large. In addition, with private information
about access to assets, it is often desirable to randomize extraneously
the return on the highest yielding government liabilities. The optimal
government policy is shown to accord well with historical observations
and provides insight into why randomization is not observed in most
private contracts.
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1 Introduction
This paper considers the problem of a government with a deficit to finance
which is faced with the following circumstances. First, the government can-
not compel agents to hold its liabilities, so they must be induced to do so.
Second, some agents have access to investments other than government li-
abilities, so the government must issue liabilities that are competitive with
these investments. Third, there is private information on the part of agents
about access to these investment opportunities. Finally, there are overlap-
ping generations of agents who are not inter-generationally altruistic. Thus
agents care only in a limited way about whether the government has honored
its obligations in the past, or will do so in the (sufficiently distant) future.
In the context of this environment we pose two questions.
(1) What is the optimal way for the government to finance its deficit (from
the perspective of steady state welfare)?
(2) How does the government commit implicitly to honor its liabilities when
explicit commitment is impossible?
We describe conditions under which optimal deficit finance involves the
government issuing as many liabilities as there are agent types, and prevents
them from being intermediated. These liabilities are issued in minimum
denominations, and different liabilities bear different rates of return. In ad-
dition, some of the government's liabilities bear extraneously randomized
returns, while others are riskless. Agents holding risky government debt di-
versify by holding some privately issued investments. When the government
deficit is sufficiently large, it turns out that it is relatively easy for agents to
induce the government to honor its debt obligations, even if the government
does not care about the welfare of the (old) agents who hold its inherited
debt. Interestingly, for implicit commitment to be possible, it is necessary
that the government deficit be "large enough," in a sense to be made precise.
While there is obviously a large literature on optimal deficit finance
schemes and commitment, we appear to be the first to have posed ques-
tions (1) and (2) in this context. Bryant and Wallace (1984) considered
the question of how to finance a given government deficit in an overlapping
generations model with homogeneous generations. However, they allowed ex-
ogenous government commitment to repayment, full information, and agents
had no access to any investments other than government liabilities. In this
context, Bryant and Wallace showed that it is optimal for the government to
issue its liabilities in (indivisible) large denominations, and to prevent them
from being intermediated. Villamil (1988) extended the Bryant-Wallace anal-
ysis by incorporating heterogeneity within generations and allowing agents
to be privately informed about their "type." In addition to the features de-
scribed by Bryant and Wallace, in her environment the optimal deficit finance
scheme requires the government to issue as many liabilities as there are agent
types, with different liabilities bearing different rates of return. However, as
in Bryant- Wallace, Villamil allowed no investment opportunities other than
government liabilities, and allowed for exogenous government commitment.
The Bryant-Wallace and Villamil analyses are successful efforts to ex-
plain why a government issues various kinds of liabilities with different' return
streams, and allows them to co-exist via legal restrictions on intermediation. 1
However, they do not explain why the government chooses to honor its obli-
gations, nor do they consider the constraints imposed on the government by
the necessity of competing with other investment opportunities. Tabellini
(1991) examines an overlapping generations model with agent heterogeneity
and private information in which the government can default on its inherited
debt if a majority of voters approve such an action. He shows that there
^icks (1935) gave the classic statement of the question: how does government issued
fiat money co-exist with other (default free) government liabilities that dominate it in rate
of return? Wallace (1983) suggested legal restrictions as an answer to this question. Bryant
and Wallace (1984) and Villamil (1988) show that such legal restrictions are desirable when
the government wants to behave as a price discriminating monopolist for reasons of optimal
taxation. See Villamil (1992) for further discussion.
need not be defaults if there is sufficient inter-generational altruism. How-
ever, for Tabellini, implicit commitment requires inter-generational altruism,
and he also does not allow agents access to assets not issued by the gov-
ernment. Also, neither Bryant-Wallace/Villamil nor Tabellini explain why a
government might extraneously randomize the returns on its liabilities.
We believe that the extraneous randomization of returns on government
liabilities, and the co-existence of government liabilities with other assets
are important features of the appropriate answers to the questions we have
posed. Extraneous randomization of the returns on government bonds is a
surprisingly common feature of historical government borrowing schemes. 2
And in market economies government liabilities must compete with other
assets. Moreover, it is often be the case that some individuals (e.g., the
wealthy) have access to investment opportunities that are not open to other
agents. A government wishing to borrow from a broad spectrum of agents is
constrained by the necessity of keeping agents with access to the best alterna-
tive investments in the market for its bonds. This leads to interesting issues
of distribution as well as efficiency that are discussed in detail by Keynes
(1940). We show that, under the conditions described in Section 5, the opti-
mal way to keep agents in the bond market when they have access to good
alternative investments is to offer them bonds with high expected, but ex-
traneously randomized returns in large minimum denominations. Moreover,
the necessity (or desirability) of keeping these agents in the bond market im-
poses considerable discipline on the government, preventing defaults under
conditions that are discussed in Section 4.
Our vehicle for analyzing these issues is a stationary, two-period lived
overlapping generations model in which a government with a utilitarian so-
cial welfare function must finance a fixed deficit of a given size. It does this by
borrowing from two types of agents that are identical in all respects but one:
2This assertion is documented in some detail in Section 6.
different agents have different access to investment opportunities other than
government bonds. 3 We assume that agent type and investment activity are
private information. If agents did not have differential investment opportu-
nities the government would raise revenue from all types equally. When the
deficit is sufficiently large, doing so drives agents with the best investment
opportunities (say type 1 agents) out of the bond market. This, in turn,
requires all revenue to be raised from type 2 agents, which a utilitarian gov-
ernment regards as undesirable. Thus the government raises as much revenue
as it can from type 1 agents without driving them out of the market, and
this requires that they be treated preferentially. When type is private infor-
mation, preferential treatment of type 1 agents creates an adverse selection
problem which optimal government policy must address.
Under conditions we describe, the government treats type 1 agents pref-
erentially by designing an asset for them with a randomized return. In con-
trast, the asset designed for type 2 agents has a lower expected (but certain)
return. Despite the fact that both agent types have identical preferences,
endowments, and equal access to the government's assets, the access of type
1 agents to an outside alternative allows them to partially insure against
the bad state of nature associated with the randomized return. Thus, type
1 agents have non-trivially diversified portfolios. Type 2 agents, having no
access to the outside alternative, prefer the certain return. In addition, gov-
ernment liabilities are issued in minimum denominations, intermediation is
prohibited, and there are as many types of government bonds (bearing differ-
ent returns) as there are agent types. We show that this policy is constrained
Pareto efficient if absolute risk aversion decreases at a rapid enough rate, be-
cause it is then the optimal way to keep type 1 agents in the bond market
3This captures situations where wealthier investors have access to investment opportu-
nities not open to poorer investors, or where a government seeks to borrow both at home
and abroad, and foreign investors have opportunities not open to domestic investors.
given the adverse selection problem. 4 The potential desirability of extraneous
randomization in environments with private information has, of course, been
previously noted by Prescott and Townsend (1984) and Arnott and Stiglitz
(1988). 5 Our model differs from theirs in that randomization is desirable here
only because agents have differential access to alternative (non-government)
investment opportunities. This causes agents who are (otherwise) intrinsi-
cally identical to have indirect utility functions that differ in such a way that
randomized allocations are Pareto superior to ones with no randomization.6
Finally, we believe our analysis sheds light on two other issues of gen-
eral interest. The first is the question, raised by Arnott and Stiglitz (1988)
among others, of why extraneous randomization does not arise as often as
theory seems to suggest. Arnott and Stiglitz suggest six potential answers:
(1) agents do not understand that randomization is optimal (perhaps be-
cause they are only boundedly rational); (2) randomized contracts may be
costly to enforce; (3) secondary markets or insurance neutralize the effects of
randomization; (4) agents view lotteries as unfair; (5) expected utility theory
is deficient; or (6) individuals do not trust randomization mechanisms. As
Section 6 indicates, governments have historically made heavy use of bonds
with randomized returns—in a way that is consistent with our theory—so
long as they could prevent bonds from being intermediated. This suggests
4The result that bonds with extraneously randomized returns are constrained Pareto
efficient in markets with adverse selection can be interpreted as asserting the desirability
of random taxation [cf., Stiglitz (1982)]. However, our focus is on government bond sales
when participation cannot be compelled, so it is somewhat different from standard taxation
analyses. In a taxation context, our model can be regarded as one in which only market
activities can be taxed and high enough taxation drives some agents into non-market (or
"underground") activities. Thus, taxation must not only raise sufficient revenue, it must
also be designed to prevent exit from market activities. The adverse selection problem
arises in this setting if and only if voluntary participation is a binding constraint.
5 Randomization may be desirable in the presence of private information due to the
non-convexities it introduces. The possibility that randomization may be desirable in
other contexts with non-convexities (for instance, indivisibilities) is discussed by Rogerson
(1988) and Shell and Wright (1993).
6This insight is essentially the same as that in Benhabib, Rogerson, and Wright (1992).
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that only (3) is persuasive in light of historical observation. Second, a large
literature exists which argues that some subset of individuals is "liquidity
constrained" (that is, they cannot borrow as much as they would like given
market interest rates), and views this as evidence of a market failure. We
show that an optimal government deficit finance scheme has the feature that
some (but not all) agents perceive themselves to be liquidity constrained.
This is not due to market failure, but is a consequence of the fact that the
government optimally inhibits private borrowing and lending.
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 describes the
model. Section 3 considers non-stochastic planning problems from which
Pareto efficient consumption allocations can be derived under three alterna-
tive sets of assumptions about the constraints faced by the planner. Section 4
examines when the government will voluntarily choose to honor its inherited
debt, and Section 5 establishes conditions under which randomized alloca-
tions are desirable. In both Sections 3 and 5 we describe how the government
can decentralize the optimal allocations. Section 6 discusses historical public
debt policies and shows that they are consistent with the predictions of the
model. Finally, Section 7 concludes.
2 The Model
Consider a discrete time economy populated by an infinite sequence of two-
period lived, overlapping generations and an infinitely lived government.
Each generation is identical in size and composition, containing a contin-
uum of agents with unit mass. Within each generation there are two types
of agents, indexed by z = 1,2. Let 6 t denote the fraction of type i agents in
each generation, with
t > and 9\ -f- 62 = 1. In addition, there is a single
consumption good at each date. All agents have endowment w3 of the good
in period j = 1,2 of their life, with w2 > 0.
Agent types are differentiated by their access to a storage technology.
Type 1 (and only type 1) agents have access to a constant returns to scale
technology for storing the good, where one unit stored at time t returns
x £ (0, 1) units at time t + 1. Assume that each agent can store only his or
her own good, that agent type is private information (ex-ante), and that the
activity of storing the good (or the quantity stored) is unobservable.
All agents have identical preferences, representable by the additively sep-
arable utility function u(c\) + v(c l2 ), where c' 6 M+ denotes the consumption
of a type i agent at age j. Assume that u and v are strictly increasing, strictly
concave, and thrice continuously differentiable, and define R(c) = —
^ri ^°
be the coefficient of absolute risk aversion. Finally, let the government have
an exogenously given real per capita expenditure level of g > each period.
Assume that agents derive no utility from this expenditure.
The assumption that type 1 agents can store the good while type 2 agents
cannot is meant to capture the problem facing a government which has a
deficit to finance, and must borrow from a set of heterogeneous agents with
differential access to alternative investment opportunities. The access of
some agents to relatively high return investments limits the ability of the
government to extract resources from them. In the model, the ability of
type 1 agents to store the good gives them access to an asset not available
to type 2 agents (the simplest form the problem can take). It proxies for
several different scenarios. For example, wealthier agents might have ac-
cess to investments not available to poorer ageri'ts. 8 Alternatively, it could
represent the situation of a government which seeks to borrow from foreign
investors, who have investment options (bearing the gross rate of return x)
not available to domestic investors. Finally, our model can be interpreted
as an economy in which direct taxation is employed, but only "market ac-
tivities" can be taxed and the differential access to the storage technology
7Or, government expenditure could affect utility in an additively separable way.
8We assume that all agents have identical endowments, but it is not difficult to let type
i agents have an age j endowment of w* with w{ > w\ [cf., Villamil (1988)].
proxies for different "non-market" opportunities.
For future reference, it will be useful to have a notation for the savings
behavior of an agent who pays a lump-sum tax of Tj at age j, and faces a
certain gross rate of return on savings of r. Such an agent chooses a savings
level, <?, to maximize u(w\ — T\ — q) + v(w2 — r2 + rq) subject to non-negativity
constraints. The solution to this problem is given by the savings function
q = f(w\ — T\,W2 — T2,r). Under our assumptions, and assuming interiority,
fi > > fa. Also, we assume that
wi > f(wi,W2,x) > 0. (a.l)
Finally, we define the indirect utility function V in the standard way:
V(w
x
- tu w2 - r2 ,r) = u{w l - n -/(•)) + v{w 2 - t2 + rf(-)).
3 Non-random Pareto Efficient Allocations
This section describes the allocations which solve a utilitarian social welfare
maximization problem under three alternative sets of assumptions about
constraints faced by a social planner. It then considers how these alloca-
tions can be decentralized by a government which sells bonds competitively,
but can impose legal restrictions on bond trades. Attention is restricted to
non-random consumption allocations. Throughout, it is assumed that the
government can commit to honor its future obligations. Whether the gov-
ernment would choose to do so when explicit commitment is impossible is
considered in Section 4.
3.1 Full Information
As a benchmark, we begin by considering the problem of a social planner
under full information. We assume that the planner knows each agent's type,
and can observe and (if desired) prohibit storage of the good. The planner's
objective is to find a stationary allocation that maximizes an equally weighted
sum of the agents' utilities subject to a resource feasibility constraint. Let k
denote the amount of storage by a type 1 agent. The full information Pareto
problem can be written as follows:
Problem 3.1. Fori = 1,2, choose values c\, c2 and k to maximize:
5>M<4) + *(4)]
i=i
subject to:
2
^^(c 1! +cj) +M < w x + w2 -g + 6 1 xk. (1)
t=i
At an interior optimum, the solution to this problem sets
«'M) = «'(4). (2)
for i = 1,2, cj = cj, for j = 1,2, and k = 0. Notice that, from (1) and (2),
c\ = w
x
— /(u>i, w2 — g, 1), and c\ — w2 — g + /(^i, w2 — gA)- Thus the
utility of agents under this allocation is given by V(wi,w 2 — g,l).
Remark. The allocation given by the solution to Problem (3.1) is identical
to that obtained by Bryant and Wallace (1984), and can be decentralized as
they describe: The government can prohibit goods storage, sell bonds with
a minimum real value of F and rate of return r, and prohibit agents from
intermediating bonds. If F and r are chosen to satisfy F = /(u>i, w2 — g, 1)
and r =
—p3-, each agent will voluntarily purchase bonds with a minimum
real value of F [when K (101,102 — 9A) ^ ^(101, 102, 0)]. This policy permits
the government to raise enough revenue to cover its expenditure.
This [Bryant and Wallace] arrangement has the feature that the govern-
ment sells indivisible, large denomination bonds. In addition, each agent
saves more than he or she would prefer at the going rate of return in a mar-
ket without restrictions on intermediation. Specifically, all individuals would
10
like to borrow against the future income from their investments (to consume
more now), but are precluded from doing so by legal restrictions. Thus, all
agents perceive themselves as liquidity constrained. This serves to emphasize
that the existence of liquidity constraints need not be a signal of "market
failure." A government financing a deficit might choose to interfere with
liquidity provision as part of an optimal deficit finance scheme.
3.2 Voluntary Participation
We now assume that the planner is subject to a voluntary participation
constraint, or in other words, that the planner cannot prevent type 1 agents
from autarchically storing the good or type 2 agents from consuming their
endowments. This represents the situation of a government that must finance
a deficit g by selling bonds, where the government is unable to compel bond
purchases. Alternatively, we may view this as the situation of a government
that cannot tax activities in an "underground" economy. We continue to
assume that the government observes agents' types directly.
The planner now solves the problem
Problem 3.2. Fori = 1,2, choose c\, c l2 , and k to maximize:
i=i
subject to: (I) and
u(c\) + v{c\)> V{wu w2 ,x)i (3)
u{c\)-\-v(c\)>u{wx ) + v{w2 ). (4)
There are three possibilities regarding the solution to Problem (3.2).
Case 1: V{wu W2 — g,\) > V(wi,w2 ,x). In this case (3) and (4) do
not bind. This occurs, obviously, if g is sufficiently small, in which case the
solution to Problem (3.2) is the same as the solution to Problem (3.1).
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Case 2: V(w\,w? — g, 1) < u(w\) -f i>(u>2). In this case the constraint
set is empty. We abstract from this possibility, which occurs if g is too large.
Case 3: V(wu w2 ,x) > V(wu w2 — g,l) > u(wi) -\- v(w2 ). In this case
(3) binds. This is the situation of interest to us so we focus exclusively on
it. The solution satisfies (1) and (3) as equalities, (2), cj > c^, for j = 1,2,
and k = 0. The solution to Problem (3.2), in this case, has the following
feature. Due to its inability to compel agents to purchase its bonds, the
government must offer type 1 agents relatively attractive terms to keep them
in the bond market. They therefore attain a higher utility level than type 2
agents. However, since (2) holds, no inefficiencies result.
9
Remark. The allocation given by the solution to Problem (3.2) can be
decentralized by the following government policy. Bonds are sold to type i
agents with a minimum real value of F' and gross rate of return r*. Then
F l = W\ — c\ and r' = C2p™7 hold. Type 2 agents are prohibited from buying
type 1 bonds, and intermediation is prohibited ex cathedra. Arguments
following those of Bryant and Wallace (1984) establish that type i agents
voluntarily purchase F x units of bonds of type i. It is easy to verify that this
permits the government to raise revenue equal to its expenditure.
This arrangement has all the features of Problem (3.1) except that the
government issues many types of bonds bearing alternative rates of return.
However, individuals' portfolios are not diversified.
3.3 Voluntary Participation and Private Information
We next consider the problem of a planner who wishes to choose non-stochastic
Pareto efficient consumption allocations but cannot compel market partici-
pation, and in addition, cannot directly observe the type of any agent. Thus,
the planner is subject to incentive compatibility constraints, as well as the
other constraints specified previously.
^Tliis corresponds to first degree price discrimination (or lump sum taxation).
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The planner now solves the problem
Problem 3.3. Fori = 1,2, choose c\, c\ and k to maximize
£ft[«(ci) + t;(4)]
1=1
subject to: (1), (3), (4), and the self-selection constraints
u(c\) + v(c\) > u(c2
x ) + v(c
2
2
)- (5)
u(c\) + v{c\) > u(c\ + k) + v(c\ - xk). (6)
(5) imposes that type 1 agents weakly prefer (c},^) to {c\,c\)}° (6) imposes
incentive compatibility for type 2 agents, since a type 2 agent taking a type 1
allocation cannot mimic the storage of type 1 agents. He therefore consumes
c\ + k when young and c\ — xk (i.e., c\ less the proceeds of storage) when
old.
Let c', ijj = 1,2, and k denote the solution to Problem (3.3). The
solution can fall into one of two general categories.
Case 1: V(wi,W2—g,l)>V(wi,W2,x)> In this case the allocation from
Problem (3.1) satisfies (3) through (6), since c] = c^, for j = 1,2.
Case 2: V(wi,w2 ,x) > V(wx,w2 — <7,1). In this case the allocation
from Problem (3.2) clearly is not incentive compatible, since c] > cj, for
j = 1,2, and k = 0. In particular, since there is no goods storage and type
1 agents are "better treated" than type 2 agents, all type 2 agents will claim
to be of type 1. We now focus on this case. It is clear that if (3) holds with
equality, then (5) will be satisfied. Hence (1), (3), and (6) are the binding
constraints in Problem (3.3). Moreover, the constraint set will be non-empty
if, for instance, V(wu w2 — jf-,1) > u(wi) + v(w2 ) holds.
We now characterize the solution to Problem (3.3).
10 Formally, (5) should be written as u(c\ ) + v(c\) > V(c\ , c\, x). However, since u'(cf) =
v'(cl) > xv'(cl) holds (see below), V(cf,cl,x) — u(c\) + v(cl).
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Proposition 1. The solution to Problem (3.3) satisfies (1), (3), and (6) at
equality, and has u'(c\) = xv'(c\), u'{c\) = v'(c\), and f{wi,w2 ,x) > k > 0.
Proof. See Appendix A.
Remark 1. The solution to Problem (3.3) has at least two interesting
features. First, as Appendix A shows, goods storage occurs. This is necessary
to give type 1 agents a utility level of V(wx,w2 ,x) without having type 2
agents mimic their bond purchases. Second, since u'(c\) = xv'(c\), type 1
agents are "on their savings functions" with respect to storage of the good.
Both of these features reflect inefficiencies due to the necessity of treating
type 1 agents preferentially in the presence of private information.
Remark 2. To decentralize the solution to Problem (3.3) the government
issues two types of bonds, and prevents intermediation. Agents who buy type
1 bonds with gross return x can buy only type 1 bonds, and are permitted
to purchase at most F units (in real terms). Agents who purchase type 2
bonds with gross return r 2 must purchase at least F 2 units (in real terms).
2
_
The government chooses F2 and r2 to satisfy F 2 = w
x
— c\ and r 2 = C2F
™7
,
and F to satisfy
F = f(wu w2 ,x)-Jc>0. (7)
Then type 1 agents are "on their savings functions." Type 2 agents optimally
purchase F 2 units of type 2 bonds, and the government raises revenue with
a per capita value of g.
Remark 3. This arrangement has the feature that type 1 agents hold
diversified portfolios, since they store goods and hold government bonds.
Moreover, type 1 agents are "on their savings functions," and hence do not
perceive themselves to be "liquidity constrained." Type 2 agents do, since
u'(c\) = v'(c\) > r 2 v'(c\). Thus, this context indicates that government im-
posed legal restrictions can lead some, but not all, agents to perceive them-
selves to be liquidity constrained. This does not signal a "market failure,"
14
as it is simply a consequence of actions taken by the government to finance
its deficit in the most efficient manner possible (given its constraints).
4 Commitment
The previous section analyzed the optimal policy for a government engaged
in financing a deficit when (a) it cannot compel bond purchases, and hence
must be concerned about keeping agents in the bond market, (b) there is
private information about agent type, and (c) the government can commit in
advance to honor its obligations in the future. This section considers whether
this policy is feasible when (c) is relaxed; that is, when the government can-
not explicitly bind itself to honor its future obligations. More specifically,
we examine whether it is possible to find an equilibrium where schemes that
decentralize the solution to Problem (3.3) have the property that the govern-
ment chooses to honor its inherited liabilities at each date (even though it is
not bound to do so). To make our results as strong as possible, we assume
that (i) the government cares only about young agents at each date, 11 and
(ii) only a "one-time default" is considered. That is, agents are assumed
to attach probability zero to a future default, even if a default has already
occurred. Obviously, both assumptions work against the feasibility of com-
mitment. We derive conditions under which the government voluntarily pays
off" on all its inherited liabilities at each date nonetheless.
The equilibrium that (potentially) allows implicit commitment operates
as follows. Suppose the government pursues a scheme that decentralizes the
solution to Problem (3.3), and suppose further that a default occurs at date
t. If a default occurs at t, young type 1 agents are assumed to withdraw
from the bond market at t and in all subsequent periods. When (3) binds
this is individually rational for each type 1 agent, since these agents are
n This is the strongest assumption we can make against the ability to commit, since
obviously old agents will want inherited liabilities to be honored.
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indifferent between lending to the government and investing autarchically.
When a complete default occurs on all government bonds (which is the best
situation for young agents at t), the government saves the resources which
it promised to pay to old agents at t. This resource savings is 6i(c\ — xk) +
92 c\ — w2 ,
12
which can be transferred to the current young. However, young
type 1 agents withdraw from the bond market, so the resources young type
1 agents contribute to financing the deficit are lost to the government at t.
This contribution is 6\(wx — c\ — fc); that is, young type 1 agents contribute
their endowment less the sum of their young period consumption and their
investment in storage. Thus the net resource gain to the government (at t)
in the event of a default is
D =
x
{c\ - xk) + Q2 c\ -w2 - 6 l {w 1 -c\- k). (8)
Using (1) in (8) gives an alternative expression for this net resource gain:
D = e2{wx -c\)-g. (8')
For all dates after t, type 1 agents are absent from the bond market
(autarky). In these periods the government maximizes a weighted sum of
young agent utilities, subject to the appropriate resource constraint, ignoring
the possibility of further defaults. Since the utility of (autarchic) type 1
agents is V(wx, iu2 ,x), the government (after t) solves the problem
Problem 4.1. Choose c\ and c\ to maximize
0iV(w1 ,w2,x) + e3[u(4) + v(4)]
subject to (4), and the resource constraint with type 1 agents absent:
2{wl +w2)-g>02 {c\ + c\). (9)
12This expression is the difference between the consumption promised to old agents
{9\c\ + ^2^2) and the sum of their endowments (1^2) plus their return on storage (9ixk).
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Let (cj, C2) denote the solution to Problem (4.1). 13 It is straightforward to
show that ix(cj) + v(c\) = V(wi,w2 — g/62 i !)• Since it is feasible in Problem
(3.3) to set c\ = cj, c\ = c2 and k = f(wx,w2 ,x), clearly u{c\) + v(c\) >
V(wu w2 - g/#2, 1) = V{wi - g/62 , w2 , 1).
We now consider the problem of the government at date t. This differs
from Problem (4.1) in two respects. First, at date t the government has
realized resource saving D. Second, it may choose an allocation different
from the one which will be chosen at subsequent dates. In any event, this
utilitarian government will seek to maximize a weighted sum of young agent
utilities, subject to the appropriate resource constraints. Since young type 1
agents are autarkic at t, the government solves the problem:
Problem 4.2. Choose c\ and c\ to maximize
O1V(w1 ,w2,x) + 2 [u(c2l ) + v{4)]
subject to (4) and the resource constraints
92{wx - c\) + D > g, (10)
c] < w2 + u'! - c\ - g/6 2 . (11)
Equation (10) asserts that at t the resources provided by type 2 agents
alone
—
plus the resource gain due to default—must finance both young type
2 consumption and government expenditures. Equation (11) states that the
old age consumption of these agents cannot exceed their endowment, plus
the resources provided by young agents at t + 1.
From (9) and (11) it is evident that c\ = c\ will hold in the solution to
Problem (4.2). Therefore, the solution to this problem yields young type
2 agents at t a utility level of u\u.\ — (g — D)/0 2 ] + u{c2 ). Obviously this
cannot exceed V{w\ — g/0 2,w2 , 1) if D < holds. Thus, D < is a sufficient
13
If the solution exists. A solution will exist if the constraint set is non-empty: that is,
if #2( u
'i + ^2) > 9 and V(wi, w2 — ff/^2. 1) > u{yj\ ) 4- v{w2 )-
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condition for a default at t to reduce the utility of young type 2 agents;
or equivalently, to reduce the value of the (time t) government's objective
function. Thus, there is no incentive for a default to occur if
D = 92(w1 -c\)-g<0 (12)
holds. 14 (12) is equivalent to
c
2
l
>w1 -g/02 , (12')
so there is no default (the government honors its commitments) if the con-
sumption of young type 2 agents is sufficiently large in Problem (3.3).
Remark 1. If (12') holds, no agent favors a default at any date under
the assumptions stated (default makes the old worse off, and does not raise
the utility of the young). Thus (12') is sufficient to guarantee unanimous
opposition to government default.
Remark 2. The government never chooses to default if (12') holds because
its reliance on type 1 agents imposes considerable discipline. The fact that
type 1 agents are indifferent between investing in government bonds and
investing elsewhere means that they are quite willing to "walk away" when-
ever there is any question about the government's commitment to honor its
obligations. This observation is reminiscent of Alexander Hamilton's notion
that government debt held by the wealthiest citizens (presumably those with
access to other investments) creates a commonality of interest between these
citizens and the government. 15 For commitment to be possible, type 1 agents
must be indifferent between holding government debt and other assets. This
indifference obtains if and only if the government deficit is sufficiently large. 16
Interestingly, Hamilton also felt that a large debt was conducive to a com-
monality of interests between a democratic government and its debtholders.
14 (12) is sufficient for there to be no default, but it is not necessary.
15 For a discussion of Hamilton's views on this point see Ferguson (1961'
16 Specifically, (3) must bind in Problem (3.3).
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Remark 3. Our focus on the desirability of a one-time default (under the
assumption of no further defaults) can be given the following interpretation.
Each (dated) government announces that it will not default. Then we ex-
amine the incentives for a deviation from this strategy by the government at
time t, given the announced strategies of other (dated) governments. (12')
gives a sufficient condition under which no government will wish to deviate
from this strategy. 1 '
5 Pareto Efficient Randomization
Having derived conditions under which the government will always choose
to honor its obligations (if they are non-stochastic in nature), we now state
conditions under which extrinsic randomization by the government can be
Pareto improving. We first do so under the assumption that the government
can explicitly commit to fulfilling its obligations. We then show that if (12')
holds, commitment is always feasible in the presence of randomized govern-
ment obligations. We begin by introducing some notation, and then consider
a constrained social planning problem that permits extraneous uncertainty.
Our objective is only to show that some extrinsic randomization is desirable,
so we proceed as follows. We assume that the planner chooses, for i = 1,2,
deterministic values c\ for young consumption, and values c^s) for old con-
sumption that may depend on an extraneous state s. For simplicity we let
s G {1,2}, and let p E (0, 1) be the exogenous probability (which is the same
in all periods) that s = l. 18 We assume that realizations of s are indepen-
dently and identically distributed across agents, and that s is realized at the
17This formulation of how policies are selected in the absence of an ability to commit is
similar to that of Cooley and Smith (1989).
18Our description treats p as exogenous, but clearly randomization can be no less desir-
able on welfare grounds if the government is free to choose p.
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beginning of old age. 19
We now consider the planning problem from which constrained, Pareto
efficient (possibly stochastic) consumption allocations are chosen. To simplify
notation, we will sometimes write Es h(c2 (s)) = ph(c2 (l)) + (1 — p)h(cl2 (2)),
where /*(•) is an arbitrary function, and E denotes the expectation operator.
The stochastic Pareto problem can be written as follows.
Problem 5.1. Fori = 1,2 and s = 1,2, choose c\, c2 (s), and k to maximize
E $Mc\) + Eav(4(s))}
1=1
subject to:
2
J2 e>lc\ +E3c2 (s)] + e1 k < Wl +w2 -g + e.xk; (13)
t=i
u(c\) + Esv(c\{s)) > V(wu w2 ,x)i (14)
u(cl) + Es v{c22 {s)) > u(c] + k) + Es v{c\{s) - xk)\ (15)
u(c\) + E,v{<i(s)) > u{c\) + Es v(cl(s)); (16)
u{c\) + Es v{c\{s)) > u(wx ) + v(w 2 ). (17)
(13) is the resource feasibility constraint, which reflects the fact that there
is no aggregate randomness. (15) and (16) are self-selection constraints, and
(14) and (17) are voluntary participation constraints.
Clearly the solution to Problem (5.1) coincides with the solution to Prob-
lem (3.1) unless (14) is binding. When (14) binds, so does (15), as in the
previous section. In this case, (16) cannot bind, and we restrict attention to
the case in which (17) does not bind. Thus, for the remainder of the section,
19This captures features of several historical randomization devices employed in govern-
ment borrowing [cf. , Section 6] where governments confronted individuals with random
returns on some bonds while they faced little or no (as here) randomness with respect to
total interest obligations on these bonds.
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constraints (13) through (15) bind. It is easy to verify in this case that the
solution to Problem (5.1) has c\{\) = Cj(2), so that only (or at most) type 1
agents face extrinsic uncertainty. This is consistent with the historical obser-
vation that governments with large deficits have made use of bonds involving
randomization with attractive return distributions that are sold to agents
with good alternative investment opportunities [cf., Section 6]. Also, it is
easy to check that the solution to Problem (5.1) has u'(c\) — v'(c\). Finally,
arguments identical to those in Appendix A can be used to establish that
k > holds, and that
u'(c\) = xEav'(cl(s)). (18)
Thus, type 1 agents are "on their savings functions," as before.
5.1 Welfare Improving Randomization
We now state a sufficient condition for c^l) ^ c\(2) to hold, so that type 1
agents face extraneous uncertainty.
Proposition 2. Suppose that —
,
~
r
^
2 ",
, > — ".j2 . holds, where c]
,
r '' v'(c^-xk)-u'(c\+k) v (c^)
c\, and k are solutions to Problem (3.3). Then c\(\) ^ c\{2).
Proof. See Appendix B.
In the remainder of this section, we provide necessary and sufficient con-
ditions for the inequality in Proposition 2 to hold. We then interpret our
result, and find that when the elasticity of absolute risk aversion with re-
spect to old age consumption is sufficiently large, extrinsic randomization is
welfare improving. The inequality in Proposition 2 can be rewritten
fl(c--**)(3-xV(c--x*)
v'{c\ - xk) - u'{c\ +k)
Note that ,...
v
;?"„.,
—rr < 7^—, so a necessary condition for (19) to hold is
v'(c^-xk)-u'(c\+k) 1-x' J v 1
decreasing absolute risk aversion (with respect to old age consumption). We
now derive a sufficient condition for (19) to hold.
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Define the function G by
ri* =1 U\ - R(c\-Xk)(\ -X)v'(c\-Xk) jG(Cl
'
C2
' M
= </(c2 - 3) - «'(cl + k) - RM ' (20)
Since (c\,c\) satisfies u'(c\) = xv'(c\), it follows that G(c{,c2 ,0) = 0. More-
over, u(c\) + v(c\) = V(wi,W2,x) holds, so that {c\,c\) is completely deter-
mined and independent of k. Thus, G is effectively a function of k alone, and
if G3(c\,cl,k) > for all k > 0, G(c\,c\,k) > will hold. This, of course, is
exactly (19).
Straightforward differentiation of (20) establishes that G3 > iff
xR'{c\ - xk) u'(c\ + k)
R{c\ - xk)
>
~v'{c\ -xk)-u'(d\ + A,-K
X
1$I$-b& -«*)>• • (2D
Since xi/(c2 — xk) > w'(c| + fc) for all k > 0, a sufficient condition for
G3(c},c2 , &) > 0, for all A; > 0, is
(l-s)fl'(c*-sfc) u»(cj + fc)
R(c2 — xk) u '{c\ + Kj
An alternative statement of (22) is obtained by multiplying both sides by
(c\ — xk) to get
(\-x)R'{b\-xk)(c\-xk)
^
R{c\ - xk)
—
{
—
—
— j > x/t(c2 — xk)(c2 — xk) —
n cj-xky{c\ + k)(c\ + k) ^
{{
t\ + k
}
u'(c\ + k)
j " [ZZ)
(22') provides the result. It asserts that G3(c},c2 ,&) > for all A: > if
the elasticity of absolute risk aversion [with respect to old age consumption,
^/.) ], is sufficiently large. Note that /?'(•) < if the utility function exhibits
everywhere strictly decreasing absolute risk aversion. 20
20 Decreasing absolute risk aversion implies that, in a choice between a safe and a risky
asset, the risky asset is a normal good. This is a common assumption about preferences.
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5.2 An Example
c
1_p
c
1_p
We now consider the special case in which u(ci) = <f>^z~ arm v {c2) —
~fz~i
with
<f>
> x and p > 0. Then —
c
'^y = 1 for all c. In addition, u'(c\) = xv'(c\)
implies that c\ = c\{^) l ^p < c}, and consequently, that c\ — xk < {c\+k)(^) 1/p
for all k > 0. In this case (22') reduces to 1 — x > xp + p Ji~+ k) for all k > 0,
which of course holds if 1 — x > xp + /Kf)
1
^- Thus G3 (c\,c\,k) > for
all k > holds if /9 is sufficiently small. This implies that the inequality in
Proposition 2 holds, and that randomization is desirable on welfare grounds.
5.3 Decentralizing the Optimal Stochastic Allocation
We must slightly augment our notation from Section 2 to describe how to
decentralize the optimal stochastic allocation. Consider the savings problem
of a young agent who faces a random lump-sum tax of t2 (s) when old, 5 = 1,2,
where the probability that s = 1 is p, and who faces a deterministic gross rate
of return r. This agent's problem is to choose a savings level q to maximize
u{w\ — Tj — q) + pv(w2 — r2 (l) + r</) + (l —p)v(w2 — r2 (2) +rq). The solution to
the problem is a savings function q = /(u>i — Ti,w 2 — t2 (1),w 2 — r2 (2),r;;j).
The optimal random consumption allocation can be supported by the
following policy. The government sells two types of bonds, and prohibits
intermediation. The bonds sold to type 2 agents are sold in a minimum de-
nomination of F and bear a deterministic return r. The government chooses
F and r to satisfy c\ = W\ — F and c\ = w2 -f rF. The bonds sold to type
1 agents are sold only in the indivisible amount F, and bear a gross return
r(l) with probability p, and r(2) with probability 1 — p. The government
chooses F, r(l), and r(2) to satisfy
c\= Wl -F- /[«;, - F,w2 + r(l)/>2 + f(2)F,x;p\; (23)
c\(l) = w2 + r(l)F + xf{-y, (24)
c5(2) = wa + f(2)F + */(•) (25)
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This works since, by (14), type 1 agents are "on their savings functions."
Bonds are sold in many indivisible denominations with alternative rates of
return, and intermediation is restricted. There is individual portfolio diver-
sification by type 1 agents, who store the good and hold government bonds
bearing random returns. Moreover, these agents do not perceive liquidity
constraints, while type 2 agents do. Finally, the government simultaneously
issues bonds with randomized returns and bonds with certain returns.
5.4 Commitment
The preceding analysis assumed that the government could commit to honor
its future debt obligations. If the government is not able to make such an
explicit commitment, it is still possible that the government would choose
to honor its inherited liabilities. In particular, when explicit commitment by
the government is ruled out, it is possible to repeat the analysis of Section 4
for schemes that decentralize the solution to Problem (5.1). As in Section 4,
a sufficient condition for the government to voluntarily make full payments
on its inherited liabilities is
c
2
l
>w1 -g/e2 , (26)
where c\ is the optimal choice of c\ in Problem (5.1). It is straightforward
to show that c\ > c\ if the solution to Problem (5.1) involves non-trivial
randomization. 21 Thus whenever (12') holds, (26) holds also.
6 Some Evidence
We have considered the problem of a government with a deficit to finance
that (a) cannot compel participation in the bond market by all agents from
21 This follows from the fact that the solution to Problem (5.1) has u(c\) + f(c?>) >
u(cj)+ t>(c2) (with strict inequality if the solutions to Problems (3.3) and (5.1) are different)
and u'{c\) = ^(c2 )- Thus c"j > c 2
,
j — 1,2 holds, and the inequality is strict if there is
randomization in the solution to Problem (5.1).
24
whom it wishes to borrow, and (b) cannot directly observe the characteristics
of agents who purchase its liabilities. In addition, (c) some agents have access
to investment opportunities other than government liabilities, and (d) agents
have differential access to these investments. Under these conditions—and
when the government can limit "intermediation" of its liabilities—we have
demonstrated that the extraneous randomization of returns on government
liabilities can easily be desirable from a welfare perspective. Moreover, the
model makes the following predictions:
(i) Extraneous randomization of returns on liabilities is desirable only when
the government's deficit is fairly large [(3) binds in Problem (5.1)].
(ii) When extraneous randomization is employed, it occurs on bonds issued
in large minimum denomination yielding relatively high expected returns,
(iii) Extraneous randomization is observed only if the government can limit
intermediation of its liabilities.
In this section we demonstrate some historical conditions where (a)-(d)
were satisfied. During the periods we describe, governments made heavy
use of liabilities with extraneously randomized returns, when their revenue
needs were large. The use of such instruments ended when "intermedia-
tion" became sufficiently efficient. The liabilities we describe were issued in
large denominations and offered relatively high expected returns. Thus the
predictions of the model seem to be substantiated by historical observation.
6.1 Some Observations
During the 17th and 18th centuries, the British and French governments were
frequently at war. During these periods of large deficits, both governments
relied heavily on debt instruments with extraneously randomized returns.
These instruments fell into three general categories.
1. "Lottery-loans'' or lottery-bonds. 22 Bond holders purchased a "ticket."
22The term "lottery-loans" is used by Jennings and Trout (1982).
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The ticket entitled them to a minimum "prize" plus the chance at augmented
earnings. For instance in the English lottery-loan of 1694, 100,000 tickets
were sold at a price of 10 pounds each. 23 "Each ticket guaranteed a minimum
return ... [of] one pound annually for sixteen years, an effective interest rate
of 6 percent," [cf., Jennings and Trout (1982), p. 28]. Prizes made the
effective (mean) interest rate paid by the government 11.25 percent, which
Jennings and Trout (1982, p. 29) indicate was high by current standards. In
some lottery-loans the prizes were additional payments of bonds.
2. Life annuities. The purchaser paid the government a stipulated prin-
cipal and named a nominee. The annuitant received interest as long as
the nominee was alive. This made the return random to the holder of the
obligation, while, the government faced little or no payment randomness
—
it benefited from the ability to sell a large number of life annuities. The
annuitant could name anyone as nominee, thus arranging a random return
not contingent on his own life. The French government offered life annuities
where multiple nominees could be listed, and the expected return offered was
a decreasing function of the number of nominees listed.
3. Tontines. Devised by Lorenzo Tonti circa 1650, tontines had many
features of life annuities, but in this case a fixed payment by the govern-
ment was divided among debtholders whose nominees were alive. Thus the
government faced little randomness in its payments if it had a large set of sub-
scribers. The lottery aspects of government tontine sales (from the point of
view of purchasers) were well recognized by both Tonti and the governments
that employed tontines [cf., Jennings and Trout (1982), pp. 6, 26]. Ton-
tines were sold in large minimum denominations and offered high expected
returns [Weir (1989)]. The standard price for a tontine share in France was
300 livre—when "at the time of the French Revolution, many workers were
23This is of the same order of magnitude as per capita income at the time. This
substantiates the model's prediction that these instruments would be issued in large
denominations.
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earning one or two livres a day" [cf., Jennings and Trout (1982), p. 2]. The
price of one share in some 18th century English tontines was as high as 100
pounds.
Thus a large array of government liabilities with extraneously randomized
returns was in use. These liabilities were sold in relatively large minimum
denominations, and offered high expected returns. In addition to being used
in England and France, tontines were employed at the same time in Denmark,
Germany, and the Netherlands. Alexander Hamilton proposed the use of a
tontine in the U.S. [cf., Jennings, Swanso-i, and Trout (1988)], and his 1790
proposal for restructuring the U.S. public debt involved the use of several
instruments offering explicitly randomized returns [cf., Calomiris (1992)]. In
England and France in particular these kinds of debt instruments were used
intensively. In Britain the lottery "attracted more subscribers than any other
form of loan" in the 1760s [cf., Dickson (1967), p. 54], and Weir (1989, p.
109) argues that "in Britain they [lotteries] appear to have been the rule
rather than the exception." In 1789 the largest component of French debt
consisted of life annuities [cf., Weir and Velde (1992), p. 12.] And, after
1699, "lotteries became a standard source of public credit" in France [cf.,
Jennings and Trout (1982), p. 30].
The importance of the inability to compel bond market participation in
the use of these kinds of debt instruments is illustrated by Dickson (1967) and
Jennings and Trout (1982), who discuss the offerings of instruments that were
under-subscribed. 24 The relevance of private information is considered by
Dickson (1967, p. 78), who argued (in the English case) that "the Exchequer
... was never certain who its creditors were at any one time." Finally, it is
apparent that these liabilities were used primarily in periods of large deficits,
since they were mainly issued in wartime.
24A further illustration of the inability to compel participation is that "the [French]
government even made them [its debt instruments] available to residents of nations at war
with France," [cf., Jennings and Trout (9182), p. 52].
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For welfare improvements to result from extraneous randomization in
government borrowing, the government must be able to limit agents from
"intermediating" or "sharing" its liabilities. Agents did attempt to do exactly
this. That governments sought to inhibit such intermediation is indicated by
the fact that the English Parliament made sharing of lottery-loan tickets
illegal in 1743-4, [cf., Dickson (1967), P. 507]. 25 The French government
also made some attempts to prevent life-annuities and tontines from being
intermediated. "Some authors claim that France preferred inalienable life-
contingent debt because there was no resale market...." [cf., Weir (1989), p.
111]. And a large component-more than 25 percent-of life annuity purchasers
in France named themselves or a close relative as nominee. When this was
the case the prospects for intermediation were very limited [cf., Weir and
Velde(1992), pp. 32-3]. 26
These observations are consistent with the predictions of our analysis.
An alternative explanation for them is that governments were simply at-
tempting to exploit a taste for gambling by running analogs to modern state
lotteries. We reject this explanation for two reasons. First, if participants in
the schemes were "risk-preferers," then the relevant debt instruments should
have borne no higher expected returns than alternative instruments with de-
terministic returns. Dickson (1967), Jennings and Trout (1982), Weir (1989),
and Weir and Velde (1989) indicate that the instruments we describe bore
high expected returns, and in fact appear to have been a surprisingly expen-
sive way to borrow. Second, unlike modern state lotteries, "lottery-tickets" in
our episodes were generally sold in quite large minimum denominations. As
25
It is also the case that a 1697 act of Parliament forbade brokers to deal in any gov-
ernment securities without the permission of the treasury [cf., Dickson (1967), p. 493].
26An interesting intermediation of French tontines occurred in Geneva in the 1760s. Syn-
dicates compiled a list of nominees of young girls who had survived smallpox and came
from families with a history of longevity. They bought tontines naming these girls as nomi-
nees and sold shares in the syndicate. After this kind of intermediation became sufficiently
widespread, the use of tontines by the French government was limited substantially.
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would therefore be expected, Dickson (1967, p. 302) reports that in England
these instruments were held by the middle and upper classes. In contrast,
Clotfelter and Cook (1990) report that participants in modern state lotteries
are primarily from lower socio-economic classes. Thus, the explanation we
propose seems a reasonable one for the observed behavior of the British and
French governments of the 17th and 18th centuries.
7 Conclusions
We have described an environment in which a government must finance a
fixed deficit of a given size. When some agents have access to investment
opportunities other than government bonds, government borrowing is con-
strained by the desirability of keeping these agents in the bond market. How-
ever, treating some agents preferentially creates an adverse selection problem.
The optimal solution to these two problems involves price discrimination by
the government, and may involve the simultaneous use of bonds with ran-
dom and non-random returns. 27 Interestingly, agents with the best outside
investment opportunities purchase bonds with random returns, and extrane-
ous randomization of bond returns is observed only when the government's
revenue needs are sufficiently large. These two features accord well with the
historical observations cited in Section 6. And, when the government's rev-
enue needs are large enough, the necessity of keeping all agents in the bond
market turns out to be a powerful factor in allowing equilibria where the
government voluntarily honors all of its inherited debt.
Finally, since the bond policy we describe is a form of price discrimination,
the existence of secondary markets or insurance would render the government
•'This borrowing mechanism can also be interpreted as one in which inflation is random
and both indexed and non-indexed government bonds co-exist, or as one where there is a
hierarchy of claims against the government, and bonds bearing high expected returns are
subject to some risk of partial default. Thus the model can confront a number of ways in
which modern governments borrow using bonds with random returns.
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unable to implement it. That is, implementation of the constrained Pareto
efficient bond policy requires the government to impose legal restrictions
that prohibit the intermediation of bonds with randomized returns. It is
interesting to- note that poorly developed financial and insurance markets
are common in many high inflation countries that choose to monetize their
deficits. For simplicity, we assume an ex cathedra prohibition against the
intermediation of assets. However, Bencivenga and Smith (1992) study the
optimal degree of financial repression in a developing economy faced with
a sustained deficit that must be monetized. They find that a government
with a deficit (that is either unwilling or unable to decrease spending or
increase explicit taxes) may be required by simple feasibility to engage in
financial repression to support its monetization program. Such repression is
much more difficult in more developed countries and may be one reason why
"lottery bonds" have not been observed more recently.
Another reason is that the existence of government liabilities issued in in-
divisible denominations can be a substantial source of indeterminacies when
allocations are decentralized. Coolev and Smith (1993) establish the poten-
tial for the indeterminacy of perfect foresight equilibria in the Bryant-Wallace
(1984) economy under their optimal deficit finance scheme. And Smith (19S9)
shows that minimum denomination restrictions can be a source of sunspot
equilibria along the lines of Shell (1977), Azariadis (1981), and Cass and Shell
(1983). The question of the optimal government policy subject to minimal
constraints on the determinacy of equilibrium in this context is an interesting
topic for further investigation.
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8 Appendix A: Proof of Proposition 1
We first restate Problem (3.3) with only the binding constraints displayed.
Problem 3.3/ For i = 1,2, choose c\, c\, and k to maximize
£*.-[u(ci) + t;(4)]
t=i
subject to
2
J2 Oi{c\ + 4) +W < w \ + w2 - 9 + °\ xk [A.l)
:= 1
u{c\) + v{c\) > V(wu ic 2 ,x) (A.2)
u(c\) + v{c\) > u{c\ + A-) + y(4 - xk). (A3)
Proof of Proposition 1. Let A n > be the Lagrange multiplier associated
with constraint (A.n), and observe the following.
At interior solutions for c\ and c\, the relevant first order conditions are
u'(c\)(ei -r\2)-X3u, (c\ + k) = e i Xi. (AA)
v'(c\){e
x + A 2 ) - X3v'{c\ - xk) = Mi- (A.5)
The first order condition for k is
X3 [v'(c\ - xk)x - u'(c\ + k)} - X x 6,{\ - x) < 0, (A6)
with equality if A- > 0.
Finally, the first order conditions for c\ and c\ at an interior optimum are
u'(c?)(02 + A3 ) = 2Ai. (A.7)
«'(c^2 + A3 ) = Mi. (A8)
Of course (A. 7) and (/1. 8) imply that t/'(cj) = r'(c^).
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Now multiply both sides of (A.5) by x, subtract the result from (A4),
and use (A. 6) to eliminate ^i
A
x ( 1
— x) to obtain
{d
x +\ 2 ){xv'{c\)-u'{c\)]<Q, (A.9)
with equality if k > 0.
We now establish that k > 0. To do so we suppose, for the purpose
of deriving a contradiction, that k = 0. Then (A.4) and (A.5) imply that
u'(c\) = v'(c\). Since (.4.2) is binding, it follows that c) > cj, for j = 1,2.
But then (.4.3) is violated, giving the desired contradiction. Thus A' > 0.
It remains to establish that f(iV},w2 ,x) > k holds. To do so we note that
(A.2) and {A.9) hold with equality. These two equations yield a unique solu-
tion for c\ and c\; namely c\ = iv\ — f{w\, w2 , x) and c\ = w2 + xf(w\, w 2 ,x).
Since (v4.2) is an equality, Problem (3.3') reduces to maximizing u(cl) + v(cl),
subject to (.4.1) — (A. 3). From (.4.1) at equality, 6 2 {c\ + c\ — w x — w2 ) —
6i[w! + w2 — c\ — c\ — (\ — x)k] — g = 0^(1 — x)[f(wi,w2 , x) — k] — g. Clearly
then, it is not optimal to set k > f{xv\,w2 ,x). This completes the proof.
9 Appendix B: Proof of Proposition 2
We begin by considering the following augmented version of Problem (5.1).
Problem 5.1': Fori = 1,2 and s = 1,2, choose c\, c l2 (s), and k to maximize
£ft{«W)+M4(i)) + (i-pM4(2))}
1=1
subject to: (13) through (15) and
U '(c\) = xpv'(cl(l)) + x(l - pyv'icK'I)). (B.l)
Since the solution to Problem (5.1) satisfies (5.1), imposition of this con-
straint does not alter the optimal choices for the social planner. Equations
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(13) through (15), which hold as equalities, and {B.l) constitute four equa-
tions involving c}, c^(l), c\(2), fc, c\, and c\ [since c^(l) = c\(2) = c\\. We
now use (13), (15), and (B.l) to eliminate c}, c\(l), and k from Problem 5.1'.
First, let (B.l) define c\ as a function of c\(l) and c\(2). In particu-
lar, define c\ = a(c\(l) , c\(2)) . Clearly, c\ = a(c\,c\) holds. In addition,
differentiation of (B.l) yields
v"(c l (D)
ax {c\(l)^{2))=px ;JV >0- (B.2)u"[c\)
aa(cj(l),4(2)) = (l-p)x \*\» > 0. (B.3)
U [Cyj
Second, substitute c\ = a(c2(l),C2(2)) into (13) at equality. This gives k
as a function of c^l), c\(2), c\, and c\. Thus define k = fi(c\(l), c\(2); c\, c\).
Observe that k = j3(c\,c\; Cj, c\) holds, and that differentiation of /?(•) yields:
A = _(2L±J!) < 0. (B.4)
1 — X
A--( <"
1
+t ~ P)<0. (B.5)
1 — X
Third, substitute c} = o^c^l), c2 (2)) and A- = /?(•) into (15) at equality.
This defines c\(2) as a function of c\(l), c\. and c\\ say c^(2) = 7(02(1); c\, C2).
As before £2 = 7(0^; c],^). Moreover, differentiation of 7(-) yields
l -p
Finally, define the function <$(•) as follows
S(cl(l);clcl) = u(a(c](l)n (-))) ^ P v(cl(l)) + (I - pH^-)). (B.l)
Observe that S(-) is the left-hand-side of constraint (14), the (binding) vol-
untary participation constraint for type 1 agents. The function S(-) expresses
the left-hand-side of this constraint solely as a function of c\(l) and cj, for
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j = 1,2. The strategy of the remainder of the proof is to show that S(-) is
locally convex in c£(l), so local randomization relaxes the voluntary partici-
pation constraint on type 1 agents and consequently is welfare improving.
Now observe that Problem 5.1' reduces to the following: 28
Problem 5.1". Choose c\, c\, and c\{\) to maximize
u(c\) + v(c\)
subject to:
6(c l2(l)-clcl)>V(wu w2 ,x). (B.S)
If c^l) = c\ at an optimum, then the solution to Problem 5.1" coincides
with the (non-stochastic) solution to Problem 3.3.
We now establish the following properties of <$(•):
8
x (~c\;c\rc\) = 0, (B.9)
and if the inequality in Proposition 2 holds,
Sn (c\;clcl)>0. (£.10)
Then setting c^(l) 7^ c\ (in some neighborhood of c\) relaxes constraint (B.7)
in Problem 5.1". It follows that at an optimum, c^(l) 7^ c\, and consequently
c\(l)
=fi c\(2). Thus there will be extraneous randomization of the allocation
received by type 1 agents.
It remains, then, to establish that (B.9) and (B.10) hold. For (B.9),
straightforward differentiation of (B.7) gives
<5 1 (c2 ;cJ,a^) = W
/ (a(-))[a 1 +a27i]+pr /(^) + (l-p)t;^2 )7i- (5.11)
Substitution of (B.2), (B.3), and (B.6) into (B.ll) gives (B.9)
28This follows since u(c\) +pv(c£(l)) + (1 - p)v{c\{2)) = V(w1 ,w2 ,x) holds.
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For (B.10), further differentiation yields
£>\\{c\;c\,cl) = «
/
'(c!)[a 1 +a 27 1 ]
2
+ u'(cj)[ai 1 +Qf 127i+a2i7i + «22(7i)
2
+ ^27ii]
+P*>"(3) + (1 - P)v"(^)(7i)
2
+ (1 " P)v'(c])lu . (5.12)
It is straightforward but tedious to show that when evaluated at (c2 , c
2
,
c2 )
<^n + C*127l + »2i7i + »22(7i)
2
+ «27n =
P (1 -P) v ( C2)
ai+Q 27i-0; (5.14)
/"«1
-2
~2w . x pxa 1 ^'"(c^)
7 11 (c2 ;c 1 ,c2 )(p + .rQ 1 ) = (l-p)V'(c^)
.^-it)(l-i)
(l- Py[v'{c\-x~k)-u'{c\ + ~k)]
Substituting (B.13) through (B.15) into (B.12) gives
(5.15)
pv"(c\) xa l v'(d\)v'"(d\ )
, n ^ lf^
\-p (\-p)v"(d\)1 1 - i>"(c2 )
K'(c2 ) v'(dl)p(l-x)v"(c\-xk) (5.16)1-p (1 -p)[*/(c2 -xfc)-u'(c} + A:)]
Clearly 6u (c\; c\, c2 ) > if the inequality in Proposition 2 holds. This com-
pletes the proof.
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